Federal Courts at the Crossroads by Miner \u2756, Roger J
digitalcommons.nyls.edu
Speeches and Writings Bar Associations
1986
Federal Courts at the Crossroads
Roger J. Miner '56
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/bar_assns
Part of the Courts Commons, Judges Commons, and the Legal Ethics and Professional
Responsibility Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Speeches and Writings at DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Bar Associations by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@NYLS.
Recommended Citation
Miner '56, Roger J., "Federal Courts at the Crossroads" (1986). Bar Associations. 4.
http://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/bar_assns/4
Roger J. Miner 
u.s. Circuit Judge 
American College of Trial Lawyers 
Downstate New York Committee 
Four Seasons ~estaurant 
New York, New York 
November 6, 1986 
FEDERAL COURTS AT THE CROSSROADS* 
The forthcoming Bicentennial celebration, commemorating the 
framing of the United States Constitution, presents a special 
opportunity for judges and lawyers to become involved in 
educating their fellow citizens about our national charter. The 
National Commission on the Bicentennial describes this important 
occasion as "an historic opportunity for all Americans to learn 
about and recall the achievements of our Founders and the 
knowledge and experience that inspired them, the nature of the 
government they established, its origins, its character, and its 
ends, and the rights and privileges of citizenship, as well as 
its attendant responsibilities."! 
I have spoken elsewhere of the. "public obligations" of 
lawyers2 and of the "communication responsibility" of judges.3 I 
think that the proper performance of those ethical duties during 
the Bicentennial year requires judges and lawyers to join forces 
in advancing the constitutional literacy of all Americans. I am 
privileged to serve on a special committee appointed by the 
Chief Judge of my Court, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, to 
develop appropriate projects and programs relating to the 
21 
Bicentennial observance. Other courts and bar associations 
throughout the nation are planning commemorative publications, 
lectures, debates, exhibitions and events of various kinds. I 
believe that the members of the American College of Trial Lawyers 
also should participate, individually and as a collegial body, in 
this important work. It seems to me that election to membership 
in this prestigious organization carries with it a unique 
responsibility -- a special obligation to make available to your 
fellow citizens your observations and opinions regarding the 
operation of the federal courts created under Article III of the 
Constitution. Yours is an insightful knowledge of litigation in 
our national court system not available to the general population 
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or even to a significant portion of the bar. I urge you to share 
that knowledge with your non-litigating colleagues and with the 
citizenry at large, as we mark the 200th year of our 
constitution's birth. It is most important that you do so 
because, after functioning for almost two centuries, the federal 
courts are at the crossroads. Tonight, I shall share with you 
some of my thoughts about the problems that have brought us to 
the crossroads, the effects those problems are having on our 
federal judicial system and the path we should follow for the 
future. 
That there has been in recent years an expansion in the size 
of the federal judiciary and in the volume of the cases it 
handles is common knowledge. The extent of that expansion may 
not be so widely known. The F.ramers of the Constitution 
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contemplated a limited number of courts having a very restricted 
jurisdiction. Hamilton foresaw, in No. 81 of the Federalist 
Papers, "four or five, or half-a-dozen" federal districts.4 
Today, there are ninety-four federal districts with five hundred 
seventy-five district judges, and thirteen federal circuits with 
one hundred sixty-eight judges. Eighty-five of those judges, 
sixty-one in the district courts and twenty-four in the courts of 
appeals, hold seats first established by Congress in 1984.5 But 
the creation of new judgeships has not kept pace with increasing 
caseloads, and already there are requests for yet more judgeships 
to be created.6 
During the period from 1964 to 1984, the caseloads in the 
United States District Courts grew by 202%.7 Between 1952 and 
1982, while the nation's population increased by 50%, appeals to 
the circuit courts grew by 808%!8 The growth continues. In 
1985, more than two hundred seventy-three thousand civil cases 
were filed in the nation's district courts, an increase of nearly 
5% over 1984 and of almost 33% over 1982.9 More than 39,000 
criminal cases were filed in the district courts in 1985, 7% more 
than in 1984 and approximately 21% more than in 1982.10 In 1985, 
more than 33,000 appeals were filed in the circuit courts 
nationwide, about 6% more than in 1984 and almost 44% more than 
in 1980.11 Closer to home, the figures are even more startling. 
Here in the Southern District of New York, civil case filings for 
1985 exceeded those for 1984 by almost 6%, but the increase in 
criminal case filings for the same period was an astounding 
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51.5%!12 In my circuit court, appeals filings increased from 
2,153 in 1980 to 2,837 in 1985, continuing the trend.l3 These 
statistics starkly illustrate the litigation explosion that has 
brought the federal courts to the gridlocked crossroads of which 
I speak. 
What are the causes of these massive caseloads? Where do 
the cases come from? It is a revealing statistic that more than 
43% of all civil actions filed in the district courts for the 
12-month period ending June 30, 1985 are classified as statutory 
actions.l4 Included in this category of cases are state and 
federal prisoner petitions as well as civil rights, social 
security, labor law, antitrust, tax and various other statutory 
claims.l5 While humorists may say that no person's life or 
property is safe while Congress is in session, federal judges do 
have cause for alarm every time Congress meets. During the 
closing days of the session just concluded, for example, major 
legislative programs affecting taxes, ih1migration and drug abuse 
were enacted into law. Each of the new statutes eventually will 
require interpretation and enforcement in federal court 
proceedings, giving rise to more cases in the geometric 
progression of our workload. 
During 1985, more than 33,000 cases were filed in district 
courts by state and federal prisoners challenging their 
convictions under statutory provisions for habeas relief.l6 
Filings under civil rights statutes rose to almost 20,000 cases 
nationwide in 1985.17 Prisoners complaining of their conditions 
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of confinement accounted for a great number of these cases as 
well. It is no secret that the great majority of prisoners' 
cases are without basis in law or fact. During my service as a 
district judge, I was confronted with a complaint by an inmate 
who claimed that he was deprived of his civil rights because he 
received a failing grade in some course he was taking in prison. 
I well remember the particular case, because the inmate referred 
to himself throughout his papers as "your despondent." I have 
the impression that these types of cases cause many judges to be 
equally despondent. Many of the non-prisoner civil rights claims 
really are state tort claims for malicious prosecution and false 
arrest dressed up in constitutional finery. The lawyers make it 
clear that statutory provisions for fees to successful 
claimantsl8 make federal court practice very attractive in these 
cases. 
Many other types of statutory actions presently compete for 
attention in the ~rticle III courts. Social security cases, 
although subject to several tiers of administrative review, 
accounted for more than 19,000 filings in the district courts 
last year.l9 The civil RICO statute now permits common fraud 
a6tions to be pursued in federal courts,20 and filings in these 
cases are increasing daily. Employment discrimination, labor 
law, securities act and tax suits of various kinds, all in ever 
greater numbers, provide grist for the federal court mill through 
legislation enacted by Congress with little consideration given 
to the impact of that legislation on the courts. 
5 
Of all the legislative activity of Congress in recent years, 
it seems to me that our national legislature has outdone itself 
in defining new crimes. Ever since the Supreme Court decided 
that criminal jurisdiction could be founded on a congressional 
declaration that interstate commerce was affected by what 
essentially is a local crime,21 the enthusiasm of Congress for 
enacting criminal laws has known no bounds. Here in New York 
City, federal prosecutors are using the federal courts to 
prosecute possession and sale of small amounts of drugs on the 
city streets, and a thirty-dollar "buy and bust" case handled by 
city police officers recently found its way to our Court.22 
These types of cases not only add great volume to the federal 
courts; they also contribute to the federalization of the 
criminal law. The Comprehensive Crime Control ~ct of 1984 added 
a number of new federal crimes that could just as well be 
prosecuted in local courts by state and local authorities. Among 
these is theft of livestock.23 The Act will have a special 
impact on the dockets of courts of appeals, because both 
prosecution and defense will be allowed to appeal length of 
sentence when the new sentencing guidelines become effective. 
At the beginning of the Republic, there were grave concerns 
that the states would erect oppressive barriers to commerce, 
interfere with mercantile trade, and prefer their own businessmen 
to businessmen from other states. Included in these concerns was 
the fear that the citizens of one state would not get a fair 
shake in the courts of another state in commercial and other 
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matters. Of this fear was diversity of citizenship jurisdiction 
born. Today, we are told, there is little concern about a fair 
shake for businessmen. Lawyers are frank in arguing the benefits 
of retaining diversity -- choice of forum, liberal and uniform 
procedural rules, more knowledgeable judges and juries, and even, 
until Congress acted a few weeks ago, cheaper filing fees. 
Whatever the reasons for its retention, the federal courts are 
awash in diversity cases, and our judges are busy trying to 
ascertain and apply the laws of fifty states. Just this past 
week, I served on a panel confronted with the problem of 
interpreting a confusing Connecticut statute that had been 
addressed only by two trial level state courts. If that weren't 
bad enough, the Presiding Judge of our panel was constrained to 
recuse himself when he realized that he was the Governor of 
Connecticut at the time the statute was enacted. In any event, 
there has been a tremendous increase in diversity filings in 
recent years, an increase that has made a significant impact on 
the workload of the federal courts. 
There are, of course, other causes for the federal court 
litigation explosion -- expansive judicial interpretations of 
various constitutional and statutory provisions, a great increase 
in the number of lawyers, free legal services for indigent 
criminal defendants, and sharp increases in administrative review 
proceedings. Whatever the cause, the problems are here, and you 
who practice in the district courts and in the courts of appeals 
are feeling the effects. In some districts, the glut of criminal 
cases makes it almost impossible to schedule a civil case for 
trial, and the time necessary for disposition of civil cases is 
increasing everywhere. Judges are unable to devote the necessary 
time and attention to each case as the load increases, and there 
is an increasing use of magistrates and encouragement of 
alternate forms of dispute resolution in the district courts. 
More and more cases are being dismissed for minor violations of 
scheduling orders. An impatient judiciary increasingly is 
turning to the use of sanctions to detet parties and attorneys 
from perceived violations of rules designed to prohibit 
unreasonable, vexatious or ungrounded litigation.24 Ironically 
enough, applications for the imposition of sanctions may give 
rise to yet more litigation.25 It seems to me that the courts 
are beginning to relax the standards for summary judgment and I 
do not believe that this development is unrelated to the caseload 
crunch. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,26 and Celotex Corp. v. 
Catrett,27 decided by the Supreme Court at its last Term, appear 
to encourage this trend. The Chief Judge of my Court, in an 
opinion issued two weeks ago, referred to a study demonstrating a 
79% affirmance rate on appeals to our Court from orders granting 
summary judgment.28 The Chief wrote of the hope that the study 
would dispel the "misperception," as he put it, that we are 
unsympathetic to motions for summary judgment. The crushing 
caseload often is the cause of judges pushing harder for 
settlement than otherwise they might. I am not unaware that 
lawyers generally welcome some judicial intervention for 
8 
settlement purposes and that most, though not all, judges are 
happy to participate in negotiations. Sometimes, however, push 
becomes shove, with unfortunate results for all concerned. I 
have even heard rumors that the attorneys who staff our civil 
appeals management program29 are known to apply the "full court 
press" in an effort to settle appeals. I have no personal 
knowlege of such things, of course. 
Even with the assistance of the C~MP attorneys, the pro se 
attorneys and the motion attorneys who serve our court, we have 
been unable to avoid cutting some corners because of the number 
of cases appealed. We always have valued our tradition of oral 
argument and still allow it to anyone who asks. With 
twenty-seven or twenty-eight appeals per week, however, the 
average time allowed is fifteen minutes per side. I suggest that 
this is wholly inadequate in most of the cases, and many 
attorneys have expressed to me their frustrations at the time 
limitations on argument. Fifty-three percent of our cases in 
1985 were disposed of by summary order rather than by signed or 
per curiam decisions.30 The summary orders are not published and 
cannot be cited,31 much to the chagrin of the bar. I, too, find 
great difficulty with the use of summary orders, but the press of 
business leaves us no alternative. 
There are but two options for those concerned about the 
future of the federal judiciary continue on the present 
c6ursei with the expectation of incremental caseload increases 
and with expansion of the judiciary continually lagging behind 
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need; or divest and restructure some jurisdiction while refining 
procedural rules. ~s a proponent of the latter course, I offer 
the following: 
1. Increase the amount in controversy required for 
diversity jurisdiction. I have come to accept the inevitable 
that diversity never will be eliminated, no matter how much of an 
anachronism it becomes. But give us a break! The amount in 
controversy figure was fixed at $10,000 in 1958. A simple upward 
adjustment to account for inflation would have an important 
effect in reducing the caseflow, according to informal estimates. 
2. Fix a statute of limitations for state habeas cases, say 
five years. This would have the salutary effect of bringing the 
criminal litigation to a conclusion as well as cutting our 
caseloads. I think that five years should be enough for anyone 
to exhaust state remedies and to find any constitutional issues 
the federal courts might examine. 
3. Require state prisoners to exhaust state administrative 
remedies before asserting federal constitutional rights 
respecting their conditions of confinement. A federal statute 
presently allows the court to stay such cases for up to ninety 
days to permit exhaustion of administrative remedies meeting 
acceptable standards.32 This statute must be strengthened to 
allow states the opportunity to address prisoner complaints in 
the first instance. I must admit that I was quite confused by 
the New York State Commissioner of Corrections, who was quoted in 
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the Wall Street Journal as saying that, although he spent 
one-quarter of his time giving depositions in these cases, he 
thought that it was good to have court decisions promoting 
consistency in the prison system.33 I always thought that that 
was his job! The same article quoted me as saying that inmate 
litigation is a "problem crying out for a drastic curtailment of 
jurisdiction in the federal courts." 
4. Cut back the criminal jurisdiction of the federal courts. 
The ever-expanding federal criminal jurisdiction threatens to 
engulf our courts with matters best left to state tribunals. The 
interests of federalism, as well as prudential concerns, argue 
for restriction of federal criminal jurisdiction to matters of 
true national interest. ~ thorough congressional study should be 
undertaken, with a view toward eliminating a large number of 
federal crimes duplicative of state legislation dealing with the 
same subject matter. Consideration should be given to conferring 
upon state courts jurisdiction over some federal crimes. Certain 
federal criminal statutes given expansive interpretation because 
of imprecise language should be amended to provide more specific 
descriptions of the prohibited conduct. 
5. In all civil litigation, the successful litigant should 
receive all costs and attorneys fees expended in the suit. The 
~merican rule34 should be abolished in the interest of simple 
fairness as well as to eliminate frivolous suits. I realize that 
recent attempts to put more bite into the modest fee-shifting 
provisions of Rule 68 have not been successful. However, I think 
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that the public would approve this proposal overwhelmingly if it 
were put to a vote. 
6. Civil 'RICO should be repealed outright. ~ compromise 
bill to restrict the application of the civil provisions of 'RICO 
failed at the end of the last session of Congress.35 ~s in most 
such situations, many interest groups had input, and nothing was 
accomplished. The Senate version of the bill was called the 
"Pattern of Illicit 1\ctivity ~ct," probably because it sounded 
better than "Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations ~ct." 
Why we need any general federal law relating to civil fraud is 
not clear to me. 
7. Eliminate unnecessary appellate argument by 
prescreening appeals. In spite of the Second Circuit tradition, 
I think it more important that selected cases have longer oral 
argument than that every case have some oral argument. Pro se 
litigants provide little or no assistance to the court through 
argument. When the proper disposition of a case is apparent from 
a glance at the briefs, there is no need to schedule that case 
for oral argument. The time is better spent with a case worthy 
of extended attention, and the overall result will be the faster 
movement of cases through the system. 
8. Congress should be required to assess the impact on the 
federal courts of all new legislation. The assessment should be 
appended to each bill as a condition of the 1\ct's passage, and 
should include projections of additional costs and personnel. 
1 ? 
9. Bxclusive jurisdiction of Federal Bmployers Liability 
~ct cases should be conferred upon the state courts. There is no 
reason why railroad employees should have a choice of federal or 
state courts for what essentially are local tort actions. 
10. Congress should create an independent commission to 
study the entire process of judicial review of administrative 
agency decisions. A number of questions should be formulated for 
the commission: What review functions should the courts perform? 
What should be the standard of review? Should there be different 
standards for different agencies? Is judicial review necessary 
in all cases? Is it necessary in social security cases to have 
review at both the district and circuit levels? Should review 
procedures within the agencies be strengthened? I suggest that 
the answer to these questions may result in legislation lessening 
the work of the federal courts in these areas. 
Some of these proposals may appeal to you; some may not. In 
either case, I again invite you to join me in public discussions 
about the future of the federal cour-ts, as we celebrate the 200th 
anniversary of the document that created them. 
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